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Boko Haram Insurgency in the 
Lake Chad Basin Region
Cecilia Idika-Kalu
Abstract
The Lake Chad Basin (LCB), in West Africa, is surrounded by three countries 
with shared borders. In the previous years, the Lake Chad Basin was a flourishing 
area, as a result of the opportunities presented by the lake for livelihood, agricul-
ture, tourism, and access to markets and trade. Severe drought has since decimated 
the socioeconomic potential of the Lake Chad Basin, but more recently, it has worse 
impact with the Boko Haram insurgency. The insurgency that started in 2002 from 
Maiduguri town, Borno State in Nigeria, has spread to the Chad and Cameroon 
leaving destruction, displacement, and the demise of a once-virile economy in 
its wake. The insecurity that plagues the region has forced millions to flee their 
homes and abandon their livelihood and trade around the lake. Major trade routes 
and markets in the area now have greatly reduced activity, as poverty and deep 
deprivation hold sway and inhabitants who have migrated or live within internally 
displaced persons camps depend on aid.
Keywords: Lake Chad Basin, Boko Haram, economy, insurgency, poverty, 
displacement
1. Introduction
Conflict ravaging the Lake Chad Basin region (LCB), driven by the Boko Haram-
led insurgency, has taken monstrous proportions. The direct impact of this reflects 
in the socioeconomic state of populations and countries in the environs. This 
chapter discusses the socioeconomic impact of the Boko Haram insurgency in the 
Lake Chad region. In analyzing the current situation, we will take into cognizance 
the historical antecedence of the region and the Boko Haram insurgency, as well as 
the group tactics and strategy in understanding the socioeconomic impact on the 
area. A microlevel analysis, studying violent extremism and the economic survival 
of people affected by the conflict, will be engaged. This is followed by the impact of 
this insurgency on the LCB and surrounding states at the macro-level.
Over time, the LCB has suffered various issues, from drought, severe effects of 
climate change, desertification, and poor governance that have contributed to deep 
poverty in the region. The LCB is encapsulating borders of Cameroon, Nigeria, and 
Chad. About 30 million people derived their means of livelihood from the resource 
provided by the 2,500,000 km2 lake in this semiarid area [1]. Precipitation in the 
lake annually reduces from the south (more than 1000 mm yr. − 1) to the north 
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of the basin (less than 100 mm yr. − 1) [2]. The Chari/Logone River system may 
account for 90% of water inflow to the LCB, which has shrunk from 22,000 km2 
to approximately 300 km2 between the 1960s and the 1980s [3]. This loss has been 
attributed to climate change and drought among other factors and has created a 
significant socioeconomic impact on the area [4].
The violent extremist activities started in Borno State, northeast Nigeria, by 
Boko Haram which spread into adjacent Lake Chad and became a regional problem. 
In 2002, Boko Haram came to the limelight in Nigeria as an Islamist terrorist group 
of the Sunni strain for preaching Jihad. Its formal name in Arabic is Jamā’a Ahl 
al-sunnah li-da’wa wa al-jihād, which is translated from Arabic to mean, “people 
committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s teachings and Jihad” [6]. The phrase 
Boko Haram is, however, the widely accepted name of the group or more recently 
the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP).
The group has unleashed violence across the Lake Chad Basin region of 
West Africa, mostly in Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. It was founded by 
Muhammed Yusuf, but the mantle of leadership was taken by Abubakar Shekau, 
the current leader after Yusuf was killed [7]. Translated from Hausa, “Boko 
Haram” means “Western education is sinful,” and this reflects the group’s two 
main aims: the opposition of what it considers to be the secular westernization 
of Nigeria, especially coeducational learning and democratic elections, and the 
creation of an Islamic state in Nigeria or at least in the country’s majority-Muslim 
northern states [8].
The crises are now raging along the borders of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. 
Between 2014 and 2015, the group held full control over large areas in northeast 
Nigeria. Later in 2015, however, Nigeria and the other countries affected in coali-
tion succeeded in taking back many of those territories captured by Boko Haram. 
The insurgents have morphed their tactics to a guerrilla war-type, using suicide 
attacks, especially with women as lethal weapons. Their refuge being in areas 
around the Lake Chad hills around the Nigeria-Cameroon border and forests in 
Borno State [5].
2. History
The founder of the movement which became Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf, 
was heavily influenced by the ideology and writings of Ibn Taymiyyah, a Salafi 
scholar [9] explained some of Yusuf ’s beliefs thus, “…quoting copiously from Ibn 
Taymiyyah, Mohammed Yusuf describes as taghut (idolatory) any form of execu-
tive, legislative or judicial function derived from a secular constitution rather 
than from Islamic Shariah Law.” This is at the root of his opposition to secularism, 
democracy, and partisan politics as practiced in Nigeria [8].
After the extrajudicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf by the Nigerian Army, Boko 
Haram became less visible in debate and discussion and greatly manifested in 
violence. The post-Mohammed Yusuf Boko Haram that evolved displayed a very 
violent agenda of political domination and establishment of a Sharia state. To attain 
this lofty goal, all elements of modern government reflective of western civilization 
had to be destroyed. All people unsympathetic to the sect’s ideology must also be 
exterminated. The modus operandi of the group is to use brutal force, combat, and 
suicide terrorism to achieve its objectives. All these have manifested in the activities 
of the members and have also been communicated to the general public through the 
use of social media, precisely through consistent YouTube videos of their spokes-
man and current leader, Abubakar Shekau [8].
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The group has modified its tactics through the years. Old methods like killing 
security officials, village heads, and security operatives changed to bombing infra-
structure, market places, and kidnap [9]. Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIS in 
March 2015 and split into two factions. Abubakar Shekau continues to lead the Boko 
Haram faction and Umar Al barnawi, the IS-West Africa faction as they are known.
2.1 Boko Haram’s structure and strategy
Boko Haram, like many terrorist groups, are not static but can alter their mission 
and approaches, to take on different shapes as they move from one location to the 
next—much as a sand dune does. They should be described and understood accord-
ing to how they evolve and what their internal and external organizational patterns 
are, rather than what they happen to be at a given moment [10]. Instead of seeing 
these organizations as networks or hierarchical structures, it is described as a dune-
like organization which shifts with the wind and is continually reshaped [11]. These 
key characteristics are evident in Boko Haram as well as Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and 
Hamas which include adherence to a grand vision like a global jihad, no institutional 
presence, giving a ghost-like organizational reality based on its disappearance when 
necessary, and dynamic activity that sticks to sequential reasoning, among others.
Using the association between networks’ density, centrality, and their outputs 
to evaluate the operational success of terror networks, [12] came up with conclu-
sions that apply to Boko Haram today. He says the group’s success in operations and 
resilience in its ability to survive and to continue to generate a systematic campaign 
of violence or, more specifically, its durability and productivity describe its success 
[12]. The significant use of women from kidnapping to suicide bombing seems to 
show a pattern that reflects Faure and Zartman’s [10] description of stages in terror-
ist activities. This phase is described as the commercialization phase, using strategic 
violence, follows the incubation stage in the organizational life cycle of the group. 
For Boko Haram, this strategy would supposedly help deliver on their mission and 
goals. It would hold the attention of their target audience (government, public as 
well as the rest of the world).
2.2 Boko haram and multiple tactics
Boko Haram has deployed different tactics in driving terrorist activities in the 
LCB region. In analyzing factors using quantitative tools that lead terrorist organi-
zations to attack undefended civilians, which they called “soft targets,” Asal et al. 
examined two distinct processes in choosing to attack soft targets. The first one 
being the one-time decision to begin attacking soft targets and, second, being the 
continued use of violence against such targets. The analysis pointed to ideology—
specifically religion—as the main factor in using civilians as targets, while organi-
zational factors like group size and network centrality are related to the number of 
incidents perpetrated [13]. According to Bloom and Matfess [14], as Boko Haram 
shifted in its demography and prioritizing in terms of suicide operations, it adopted 
the “unexpected bomber” profile of women and children.
2.3  Female suicide bombers, kidnappings, and media in the evolution of 
strategy
The year 2013 showed an evolution in Boko Haram’s tactics. Boko Haram carried 
out kidnappings, in which one of the main characteristics was the instrumental use 
of women. From data and reports from Mendelboim and Schweitzer [15], in 2017, 
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a record of 126 women and girls accounting for 92% of the global figures of female 
suicide bombers were of the Boko Haram sect, carrying out attacks in Africa. It has 
been argued, and logically so, that Boko Haram’s recognition by global media gained 
from the Chibok kidnappings in April 2014 helped establish this pattern [16, 17]. 
The #BringBackOurGirls campaigns, after the group abducted about 276 school-age 
girls from a school in Chibok, Northeastern Nigeria, caused an increase in the use of 
women in waging war. Understandably, Boko Haram realized the potency of gen-
dered dimensions, especially in media for its campaign. This is evidenced in terms 
of its current strategy and notoriety and continued pattern. Looking at the trend of 
actions between 2002 when the group started in 2019, the use of women only picked 
up after the Chibok case. It is crucial to note the specific role the media played.
3.  Boko haram, welfare, and development: What is the existing 
evidence?
3.1 Development and socioeconomic situation
Generally, inhabitants of the LBC live with relatively high poverty rate and 
population pressure, with about 50 people per km2 [19]. The human population 
in the area is expected to grow annually by an estimated 2.5–3.0% [18]. The area 
is also prone to intense water scarcity with access to less than 550 m3 of water 
per year [20]. Their challenges include poor medical facilities, human literacy, 
and inadequate water supply [21]. The critical factor to the economy of this 
region is the level of displacement resulting from the conflict and the consequent 
unemployment and deprivation. As Boko Haram continues its attacks in the area, 
thousands are forced to flee across the borders between the countries around the 
LCB, and within the states [22], records of thousands of refugees fleeing Nigeria to 
Cameroon when insurgents sacked Rann, one of the border towns, recorded. The 
same was the case with over 5000 inhabitants of Baga, another city on the border 
of Chad, fleeing across the Lake into Ngouboua village in Chad. This new demo-
graphic is dependent on aid and accounts for a swelling vulnerable population and 
fragile economy in the LCB.
The main points for trade and access to local markets for inhabitants, which 
are the borders are mostly closed for security. Some livestock farmers move their 
herds through longer routes passing Niger, from Chad to sell at higher prices at the 
border markets. Commercial activities from fishing and agriculture have become 
restricted. Counter-terrorism endeavor by joint task force has been recorded to 
involve “clearing out” areas around the border, surrounding forests, and the lake 
shores. This military style operations targeted at flushing out insurgents have the 
side effect of destabilizing the lives of local fishermen and farmers [5]. Maiduguri, 
in Borno State, Nigeria, has an ancient history of serving not only as a cultural and 
religious hub but as the commercial heartbeat of the LCB region. Going back to 
thousands of years culturally, the Kanem-Bornu Empire and Kanembu of Chad are 
akin to the Kanuri in Nigeria in the way of life and language. The threat of constant 
Boko Haram activities over the last few years in the area has negatively affected 
business in the region and the rest of Northeastern Nigeria.
3.2 Poverty and ripe recruits
Following the high levels of displacement and refugee status, inhabitants of 
the LCB seeking a means of generating income and employment engage in hawk-
ing agric produce and menial tasks. Many send their children to Koranic schools, 
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entrusting their children whom they are unable to care for to religious teachers. 
In many cases, this leads to radicalization of the children and the perpetuation 
of extremism [23]. Scholarly work on reasons why insurgency and terrorism 
may thrive shows that the socioeconomic environment is a critical predictor. The 
response of people, especially women, to this is participation in these organiza-
tions [24, 25]. Governance failure, corruption, economic marginalization leading 
to poverty, unemployment, inequality, and hunger are challenges faced by people 
in Nigeria and the LCB in varying degrees. According to Matfess [26], and cor-
roborated by Walker [27], some Boko Haram women exercised agency in joining the 
ranks to make their quality of life better. Contrary to the argument of some scholars 
like Zedalis [28], regarding this point poverty does breed terrorism.
Radicalization is associated with poverty in some cases [29], in the context of 
Northeastern Nigeria and the LCB, radical groups offer economic prospects. A 
Time magazine publication [30] giving an account of victims of Boko Haram tells of 
Fatima G. She narrates how 15 of her female friends accepted to be suicide bomb-
ers after being feted with treats and stories of martyrdom. Sen [31], in his seminal 
work on development as freedom, alludes to the fact that women’s agency and well-
being are critical to political and social action. The study showed women’s agency 
and voice through independence and empowerment in literacy, education, earning 
power, and property rights as necessary. These same factors, or just put, the lack of 
their availability, cause the exercise of agency in mass violence by suicide bombing.
3.3 History, culture, and colonization
The history and culture of an area influence the nature of insurgency in the area. 
The long history of drought, for example, had left the LCB and Northeast Nigeria in 
poverty, before the insurgency started. Colonization played a part in the history and 
origins of conflict in Nigeria. In Nigeria, the colonial masters—Britain—left a his-
torical legacy of social fractures in the northeast, making it easier for Boko Haram 
to recruit followers in the 2000s. The colonialists handpicked the mountain people 
from Gwoza, made them the elite class and the larger group—the Dgwhede who felt 
marginalized and are currently some of the most militant Boko Haram fighters [27].
The Kanuri-speaking people, covering Gwoza, Dgwhede, Borno, and Northeast 
Nigeria, also had a culture of purdah (seclusion of women) and mubaya (oath of 
secrecy). The culture alligns with religion practiced in the area now, as well as com-
monly held beliefs around patriarchy, polygamy, divorce, and women’s work in the 
farms [32, 26]. Meagher [24] argues that the specific interaction of culture, agency, 
and power in social contexts and how they relate to economic networks and politi-
cal process affect outcomes in an area. History has evolved with a strong culture 
of structural violence against women in places like Northeastern Nigeria. This 
oppression manifests itself in limited opportunities and repressive norms for them. 
It informs their participation with radicalized groups in a way that mixes coercion, 
consent, and autonomy [26].
4. Where do we go from here?
Consistent across findings from the previous study, development reports, and 
media analysis are the facts of a socioeconomic crisis in the LCB. Various policy 
recommendations have been made on improving the human and economic condi-
tions of life in the LCB from academia to development experts. The World Bank, in 
building resilience for the area, initiated the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) 
to engage with the challenges and developed a plan. The purpose of the LCBC is 
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to reduce poverty and address climate change and food security. Furthermore, the 
LCBC, in cooperation with the French Development Agency, affected countries, 
and the World Bank, plans on allocation of about $1 billion to this cause. The 
priority themes for allocating the funds, however, show a paltry 8% for managing 
conflicts in the area [33].
The impact of Boko Haram activity in the area may require a direct or indirect 
significant allocation of resource in policy design, to defeat the insurgency, for 
meaningful progress to take place. Some have advocated for better cooperation 
between the countries in the LCB instead of closing borders, which increases 
poverty [5]. This approach may have a better potential for socioeconomic develop-
ment in the region but has to take into account the large migrant flows between 
the countries as a result of the insurgency. The recommendation made by Okpara, 
Stringer, and Doughill [34] is vital to this end. They state that interventions should 
aid cohabitation as well as income opportunities for mixed migrants in the area.
Migrant populations displaced by the insurgency live as IDP’s in camps within 
the northeast of Nigeria. These people, in their millions, have lost access to farm-
lands, tools, and markets to create a livelihood for themselves or contribute to the 
local economy. Many have fled across the national borders into Chad and Cameroon 
depending on aid for food and shelter and putting further stress on scarce natural 
and economic resources. The existing background of deep lack and deprivation 
in the LCB accelerated by Boko Haram attacks calls for solutions proffered with 
security implications well considered. While the shrinking lake and harsh climate 
have left a hitherto agrarian region severely affected by drought and lack of water, 
the impact of conflict concludes the disaster scenario. This triad of devastation can 
be engaged at different levels; however, for socioeconomic improvement to proceed, 
peace has to return as a precursor to investment, employment, and trade.
Proposed interventions with strategic components addressing security in the 
area directly as a step to socioeconomic change may be more impactful. In this 
regard, Angerbrandt [35] states the need for coordinating regional demobilization 
plans for vigilante members and stopping conflicts before they escalate. Enobi 
and Johnson-Rokosu [36] posit that eliminating terrorist finances or considerable 
reductions to their illicit financial flows by the government, and global effort is the 
direction to take. Providing water and food in critical parts of the LCB will remove 
an essential recruiting tool from Boko Haram. This is because 1.9 million displaced 
people and 2.7 million people with food insecurity live in the area according to the 
displacement tracking matrix of the IOM [37]. These people whose needs are as 
essential as food and water would succumb to offers that would offer these seem-
ing benefits [38].
5. Conclusion
Meaningful intervention in the socioeconomic development of the LCB should 
not exclude significant investments in security, counter-terrorism measures, and 
food programs. Shelter, infrastructure, access to markets, and gender-informed 
policies are necessary to guide aid as well as policy and infrastructure that are 
gender-informed. The possibility of reviving trade in spite of the damage already 
done to the economy will have to entail more than military effort [5].
A clear strategy that considers the multilevel intersectionality of factors that 
drive the Boko Haram strategy and informs the economic condition in the area 
should be the basis of interventions. These factors are the unique historical, socio-
cultural, and development context of the Lake Chad Basin as well as the effect of 
climate change on the lake and livelihood. Policy implementation that will defeat 
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the insurgency and direct investment into the region and boost socioeconomic 
development in the short- and long-term may not be easy to enact. This is because 
of the governance problems, corruption, and structural patriarchy that are common 
to the countries in the LCB. The gains, however, are essential and worth the effort—
the equivalent of saving human lives.
In making recommendations, an essential point to note is the question of 
responsibility. In whose hands does the buck of responsibility regarding socioeco-
nomic development of the Lake Chad basin rest? The perspective of state sover-
eignty will suggest Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, maybe Mali, and other interested 
West African nations to bear the brunt alone—regardless of their capacity to do 
so. A world polity theory perspective however will suggest differently [39, 40]. 
This framework highlights the global system as one social system with a cultural 
framework referred to as “world polity.” This takes into account every actor in the 
world system and influences international organizations like the UN, states as 
well as individuals affected by both. This social system is governed by principles 
and models that shape the course and objectives of social actors and what they 
do [39, 40]. From this perspective, the security situation in the LCB, negatively 
impacting the economy and adversely affecting the lives of millions, does have 
grave global import.
Changing the socioeconomic situation in the region and turning the fortunes 
of its inhabitants should give attention to the global and local nature of the causes 
and proposed solutions. Independently, and in collaboration, the affected states 
and global actors, like development organizations, nonprofits and other states 
within the region, can gradually effect change. Insecurity from insurgency affect-
ing the region is a global phenomenon so is climate change causing drought in the 
LCB. Interventions designed around intelligence, capacity building, foreign direct 
investment, and environmental protection driven locally and influenced globally 
will be key to restoration in the Lake Chad Basin.
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